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Originally, the Arkansas Constitution required 
that all prosecutions, except for a few limited 
categories of offenses, be instituted by indictment 
or presentment. l In 1937 the Arkansas Constitu-
tion was amended to provide that all offenses 
which had been required to be prosecuted by 
indictment could be prosecuted either by indict-
ment by a grand jury or by information filed by 
the prosecuting attorney.2 The constitutionality 
of this practice of charging offenses by informa-
tion has been upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court and the Arkansas courts.3 • In 
1977, the Prosecutors' Trial Manual noted that 
the standard practice in Arkansas was to charge 
criminal offenses by information.· 
The 1937 amendment brought Arkansas within . 
the majority of jurisdictions, commonly referred 
to as "information" states, which permit felony 
prosecutions to be brought either by information 
or indictment. Ii In all but a few of these states, 
however, an information can be filed only if there 
has been either a preliminary hearing bindover 
by the magistrate or a waiver of the hearing.6 
Arkansas is one of those few states which do not 
require a preliminary hearing bindover or waiver 
of the hearing prior to filing of the information. 7 
It has been noted that even these so-called 
"direct filing" jurisdictions which do not require 
a preliminary hearing do add special require-
ments to the filing process to ensure that the 
information is supported by probable cause.8 For 
example, at least one state requires that direct 
filing be approved by a magistrate who reviews 
affidavits accompanying the information to 
determine that probable cause exists, and another 
state requires the prosecutor to certify that the 
information is based upon testimony received 
under oath from the material witness or wit-
nesses for the offense.9 The Uniform Rules of 
Criminal Procedure provide for a probable cause 
determination at the first appearance, after which, 
if the defendant is unable to obtain his pretrial 
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release, he is entitled to a probable cause deter-
mination at an adversary hearing within five 
days after his arrest.lO Arkansas has no such 
special requirements. 11 What pretrial procedures, 
then, are available for a defendant to challenge 
his prosecution based on the absence of probable 
cause for detention or prosecution? Though the 
statutes and state rules of criminal procedure 
appear to provide several safeguards, as we shall 
see, these safeguards are to a large extent illusory. 
The First Appearance and Preliminary Exam-
inationI2 
A. Now You See Them .... 
1. The Statutes 
Three sections of the Arkansas statutes govern 
the pre-arraignment appearances of the defend-
ant before a magistrate. These sections, 43-601, 
43-603 and 43-605, have been treated by the courts 
as the governing provisions for any claim to a 
preliminary examination or first appearance in 
Arkansas. I3 Section 43-601 provides in the case 
of a warrantless arrest, that the defendant shall be 
"forthwith" carried before the most convenient 
magistrate of the county in which the arrest is 
made and that the grounds for the arrest be 
stated to the magistrate. I. If the offense is charged 
to have been committed in a different county 
from that of the arrest, then the magistrate must 
find that there are "sufficient grounds for an 
examination," which phrase is not defined by the 
statute. If the magistrate believes there to be such 
grounds, then he shall by written order have the 
defendant conveyed before a magistrate of the 
county in which the offense is charged to have 
been committed. 15 When the arrest is made in the 
county in which the offense is charged to have 
been committed, section 43-603 specifically pro-
vides that the magistrate before whom the 
defendant is carried must cQnduct a preliminary 
examination of the charge. I6 Section 43-605 
establishes the procedure to be followed when the 
person has been brought before the magistrate 
with the authority to examine the charge. It 
simply provides that the charge shall be "forth-
with" examined, "reasonable time" being allowed 
for procuring counsel and the attendance of wit-
nesses. The magistrate, before commencing the 
examination, must state the charge and ask the 
defendant whether he requires counsel.J7 The 
magistrate is to release the defendant under sec-
tion 43-618 if there is not "sufficient cause" for 
believing the defendant committed the offense, 
and is to hold the defendant for trial under sec-
tion 43-619 if there are "reasonable grounds" to 
believe the defendant guilty. Thus these statu-
tory provisions do not set forth ~ first appearance 
as a separate and distinct proceeding from the 
preliminary examination except when the defend-
ant is first brought before a magistrate not in the 
county in which the offense was committed. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that 
sections 43-601 and 43-603 are directory and not 
mandatory, and that therefore failure to provide 
a preliminary examination or first appearance 
under these provisions is not reversible error. 19 
Moreover, in Payne v. State,20 the appellant con-
tended that a preliminary examination was 
required before a prosecutor could file an infor-
mation under section 43-806, which states that: 
Whenever a defendant has been held to 
answer at a preliminary examination to 
await the action of the grand jury, or has 
been held for the circuit court, the prosecu-
ting attorney may proceed to file informa-
tion in the circuit court and to trial of the 
case; provided the prosecuting attorney, with 
the consent of the circuit court, may nolle 
prosequi any indictment or information 
pending in said court. 
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-806 (1977). The Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that no preliminary exami-
nation was required prior to filing of an 
information. 21 
In Payne, the defendant was arrested without a 
warrant but was never taken before a magistrate. 
During his incarceration he gave a confession 
which the United States Supreme Court subse-
quently found to be coerced. 22 The Supreme Court, 
in evaluating the evidence of coercion, noted that 
Payne "was denied a hearing before a magistrate 
at which he would have been advised of his right 
to remain silent and of his right to counsel, as 
required by Arkansas statutes .... "23 The 
Court had earlier in the opinion referred to the 
Arkansas procedures under sections 43-601 and 
43-605. 24 Though there is some ambiguity in the 
Supreme Court's statement as to whether it 
thought the hearing was required, or only that 
the warnings were required when there was a 
hearing, the opinion in its entirety suggests that 
the Court viewed section 43-601 as requiring a 
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preliminary examination for all warrantless 
arrests. 25 Nevertheless, since Payne, several 
decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court have 
reiterated that section 43-601 is directory and not 
mandatory.26 
2. The Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 
On January 1, 1976, the Arkansas Rules of 
Criminal Procedure went into effect. Rule 8.1, 
"Prompt First Appearance," provides that "an 
arrested person who is not released by citation or 
by other lawful manner shall be taken before a 
judicial officer without unnecessary delay."z7 At 
the first appearance, the judicial officer must 
inform the defendant that: (1) he is not required to 
say anything, and that anything he says can be 
used against him; (2) he has a right to counsel; 
and (3) he has a right to communicate with his 
counsel, his family, or his friends, and that rea-
sonable means will be provided for him to do SO.28 
Rule 8.3(c) requires the judicial officer, prior to the 
question of the defendant's pretrial release, to 
determine "by an informal, non-adversary hear-
ing whether there is pro bable cause for detaining 
the arrested person pending further proceed-
ings."29 It also provides that the standard for 
determining probable cause shall be the same as 
that which governs arrests with or without a 
warrant. 30 Except for these two sentences in Rule 
8.3(c), there is no further reference in the Rules to 
a probable cause determination or any explicit 
reference to a preliminary hearing. 
Rule 8.1 is taken almost verbatim from the 1968 
Approved Draft of the ABA Standards for Pre-
trial Release. 31 Significantly Rule 8.3, based on 
section 4.3 ofthe 1968 Standards, omits that sec-
tion's requirement that the defendant be ade-
quately advised, " ... where applicable, [that] 
defendant has a right to a preliminary examina-
tion."32 The two sentences in Rule 8.3(c) dealing 
with the probable cause determination do not 
appear in the corresponding subdivision of the 
1968 ABA Standard.a3 The Prosecutors' Trial 
Manual suggests that the omission of any "sig-
nificant" discussion of the preliminary hearing 
in the Arkansas Rules may have occurred because 
the drafters were awaiting the Supreme Court's 
decision in Gerstein v. Pugh. 34 However, what 
appears to be the omission of any discussion of 
the preliminary hearing in the Rules may be more 
logically attributed to a lack of such discussion in 
the 1968 ABA Standards for Pretrial Release 
upon which they were based. 
3. Gerstein v. Pugh 
Only a few months before the Arkansas Rules 
took effect, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Gerstein v. Pugh, a case challenging the 
constitutionality of Florida's pretrial proce-
dures.35 The Court focused on two issues: whether 
a person arrested and held for trial on an infor-
mation is entitled to a judicia,.-l determination of 
probable cause for detention, and, if so, whether a 
full-blown adversarial hearing was required for 
the probable cause determination.36 In response 
to the first issue, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of 
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended rea-
traint of liberty following arrest.37 The Court 
accordingly disapproved of the Florida procedure 
which permitted a person arrested without a war-
rant and charged by information to be jailed or 
subjected to other restraints pending trial with-
out any opportunity for a probable cause deter-
mination.98 In so holding, the Court also made it 
clear what it was not holding: 
In holding that the prosecutor's assessment 
of probable cause is not sufficient alone to 
justify restraint of liberty pending trial, we 
do not imply that the accused is entitled to 
judicial oversight or review ofthe decision to 
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's 
prior holding that a judicial hearing is not 
prerequisite to prosecution by information. 
Nor do we retreat from the established rule 
that illegal arrest or detention does not void 
a subsequent conviction. 
420 U.S. at 118-119, 95 S. Ct. at 865-866 (citations 
9mitted). ' 
Having found that a pretrial detention hearing 
was required, the Court nevertheless held that 
the issue could be determined reliably without an 
adversary hearing, with the standard of review 
in the hearing being the same as that for arrest-
probable cause tQ believe the suspect has commit-
ted a crime.39 This determination could be made 
without cross-examination, or a right to appointed 
counse1.40 Beyond these parameters, however, 
the Court left much discretion in the states to 
fashion appropriate procedures: 
Although we conclude that the Constitution 
does not require an adversary determina-
tion of probable cause, we recognize that 
state systems of criminal procedure vary 
widely. There is no single preferred pretrial 
procedure, and the nature of the probable 
cause determination usually will be shaped 
to accord with a State's pretrial procedure 
viewed as a whole. Whatever procedure a 
state may adopt, it must provide a fair and 
reliable determination of probable cause as 
a condition for any significant pretrial res-
traint of liberty, and this determination 
must be made by a judicial officer either 
before or promptly after arrest. 
ld. at 123-125, 95 S. Ct. at 868-869 (footnotes and 
citations omitted). 
In summary, then, an Arkansas defense attor-
ney, seeking protection of his or her client before 
the filing of an information, may turn to three 
sources for that protection. The Arkansas sta-
tute, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of Gerstein v. Pugh all 
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appear to provide limitations on the state's abil-
ity to detain or otherwise affect the rights of the 
arrested person. The remainder of this Article 
will demonstrate that these limitations are, 
mostly, illusory. 
B. Now You Don't •.• 
As noted earlier, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
has made it clear that a IlI'st appearance or pre-
liminary examination is not required under the 
Arkansas statutes. The only provision of the 
Arkansas Rules which arguably might mandate 
a preliminary hearing is the req uirement of Rule 
8.3(c) that a probable cause determination be 
made,n although it refers to an "informal, non-
adversary hearing." However, the introduction 
to th,e 1968 ABA Standard upon which the first 
sentence of Rule 8.3( c) is based makes it clear that 
. the question of pretrial release under that stan-
dard is to be made at the first appearance. 42 Since 
the second sentence of Rule 8.3(c) requires the 
judicial officer "first" (that is, prior to the ques-
tion of pretrial release) to determine probable 
cause, the Rule is read more logically as mandat-
ing its probable cause determination at the first 
appearance. Such an interpretation is also more 
in keeping with the requirement of Rule 8.5 that 
the pretrial release inquiry be conducted prior to 
or at the first appearance of the defendant. 43 
Thisperspec"tlve - - that the probable cause 
determination required in Rule 8.3(c) is to be 
made in the first appearance and not in a prelim-
inary examination - was taken by the Federal 
District Court for the Western District of Arkan-
sas in Reeves v. Marbry.44 In Reeves, the defend-
ant claimed that he had been denied counsel in 
his preliminary hearing. Because there is a right 
to counsel in a "preliminary hearing" as defined 
by the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama,45 
but not in the Gerstein probable cause hearing, 
the district court had to determine the nature of 
the Arkansas preliminary hearing. The district 
court noted that the two factors cited in Coleman 
to distinguish a preliminary hearing from a Ger-
stein probable cause hearing are: (1) that the 
function of the preliminary hearing is to deter-
mine whether the evidence justifies charging the 
defendant with a criminal offense, not to deter-
mine whether there are sufficient grounds for 
pretrial detention; and (2) in a preliminary hear-
ing the suspect may confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses. 46 Based on this analysis, 
the court concluded: 
Arkansas provides for an informal prob-
able cause hearing at the defendant's first 
appearance. Ark. R. Crim. P. rule 8.2. 
Arkansas also provides for a subsequent 
preliminary hearing which is a formal 
adversary proceeding analogous to the Ala-
bama procedure held "critical" in Coleman 
v. Alabama, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-601 
through 631.47 
Since neither Rule 8.3(c) nor any other Rule can 
be read as mandating a formal, adversarial 
probable cause determination in a preliminary 
hearing, the preliminary examination is still not 
required under Arkansas law. 
Gerstein has resulted in other indirect limita-
tions upon the preliminary examination. Ger-
stein made it clear that neither the Fourth 
Amendment nor due process requires a full-blown, 
adversarial hearing to determine probable cause 
for prosecution. As a result of Gerstein and Rule 
8.3, the Prosecutors' Trial Manual notes the fol-
lowing ways in which the courts have attempted 
to streamline the judicial albatross, the prelim-
inary hearing: 
(1) Some courts are allowing more hearsay 
evidence to be used, including state lab 
reports, sworn statements from or hearsay 
statements of out-of-state witnesses, and 
statements showing chain of custody of evi-
dence instead of personal testimony. 
(2) Some courts are limiting cross-examin-
ation to the areas of factual determination 
and excluding inquiry into credibility, char-
acter, and motive. 
(3) Some judges will close the hearing 
when probable cause has been estabished 
and will require that any further issues of 
fact be resolved at trial. 
Prosecutors ' Trial Manual at 164 (footnote 
omitted). 
The end result of the confusing overlap of stat-
utes and rules in Arkansas, in conjunction with 
the relevant case law, is that the first appearance 
requirements of Rules 8.1 and 8.3 are the most 
reliable pretrial safeguards to ensure some deter-
mination of probable cause, albeit for pretrial 
detention only. In contrast to its decisions on 
section 43-601 to 43-605, the Court has held that 
the provisions of Rule 8.1 are mandatory. In 
Bolden v. State,4R the defendants received no 
hearing from the time of their arrests until one 
month later when they were formally arraigned 
on the charges. In light of Gerstein's holding that 
the Fourth Amendment req uires a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause for detention as a 
prerequisite to extended restraint of the arrestee's 
liberty following arrest, the Court concluded that 
Rule 8.1 was mandatory in scope.49 
Understandably in terms of judicial economy, 
there has been a trend away from the full scale 
preliminary hearing in some courts. 50 Although 
the Constitution may require nothing more than 
the procedure set forth in Rule 8, Arkansas 
appears to be unique among direct filing states in 
its minimum of procedural safeguards to accom-
pany filing of an information. What is and is not 
provided to the defendan t by Rule 8, then, becomes 
crucial to determining what screening procedures 
the defendant might expect and the prosecutor 
anticipate. 
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First, it was noted in Gerstein that a person 
arrested under a warrant in Florida could have 
already received a judicial determination of prob-
able cause. Under the Florida Rules, a warrant 
could be issued upon a sworn complaint that 
stated facts showing that the suspect had com-
mitted a crime, and the magistrate could also 
take testimony under oath to determine if there 
were reasonable grounds to believe the complaint 
is true. 51 Apparently some prosecutors have used 
a similar procedure to their advantage. In the 
Prosecutors' Trial Manual, one author remarks 
that: 
Some prosecutors have sought to avoid 
the necessity of Gerstein hearings and pre-
liminary hearings by presenting to the judge 
issuing the arrest warrant an affidavit of a 
primary witness on the back of the criminal 
information filed summarizing the facts. 
The judge considers the sworn allegations 
and endorses that he has found prob-
able cause to detain the defendant. 
Prosecutors ' Trial Manual at 165 (emphasis 
added). This procedure, though apparently auth-
orized by Gerstein, would appear to provide little 
screening by the magistrate (particularly if effec-
tuated as described above), and no opportunity 
for input by the defendant. The author goes on to 
warn that this procedure "does not obviate the 
requirement of a first appearance or a plea and 
arraignment in circuit court."52 The author is cor-
rect in that Rule 8.1 still requires a first appear-
ance by the person arrested before a judicial 
officer without unnecessary delay and section 43-
1202 requires arraignment for felonies. Arraign-
ment is defined as "the reading of the indictment 
[or information] by the clerk to the defendant, 
and asking him ifhe pleads guilty or not guilty to 
the indictment [or information]. 53 The statutory 
provisions and Rules appear to contemplate two 
separate proceedings and functions for the first 
appearance and the arraignment. Although in 
the first appearance the defendant must be 
informed of the charge and his rights, as in the 
arraignment, the focus of the first appearance is 
the validity of pretrial detention. The focus ofthe 
arraignment is the defendant's plea. Signifi-
cantly, Rule 8 governing the first appearance is 
entitled "Release by Judicial Officer at First 
Appearance" although the corresponding title in 
the ABA Standards reads "Release by Judicial 
Officer at First Appearance or Arraignment."54 
Nevertheless, the distinctions between the two 
proceedings may tend to blur in practice when 
one hearing functions as first appearance and 
arraignment. One such example is McCree v. 
State. 55 In McCree, the defendant was arrested on 
the day of the alleged crime. According to the 
opinion, the defendant's allegation of error was 
directed only to the Arkansas system which per-
mits a prosecutor to file an information directly 
in circuit court without a pretrial hearing. 56 The 
Court upheld this aspect of the system based on 
prior precedent and its opipion that nothing in 
Gerstein "require[s] dismissal of the charges."57 
In reaching this conclusion the Court referred to 
Rule 8.1.58 It noted that the defendant was 
"arraigned" eight days after the crime, at which 
time the charges, penalty, and his constitutional 
rights were explained and the defendant "an-
nounced he had retained counsel."59 No mention 
of any other pretrial appearance by the defen-
dant is made in the opinion. It is unclear whether 
the Court considered the defendant to have 
received a first appearance, a formal arraign-
ment, or both procedures in one. 
The distinction is not merely one of semantics 
for a defendant, who may risk waiving procedu-
ral protections by assuming that a hearing is 
something other than what the judge conceives it 
to be. The danger is particularly acute when the 
defendant is confronted with an arraignment/ 
first appearance for, in trying to do too much in 
one hearing, the court may in fact do too little. 
Totally aside from the considerations, using 
arraignment as the first appearance of the 
defendant under Rule 8 runs a substantial risk of 
impermissible delay in bringing the confined 
defendant before the court for the Gerstein prob-
able cause determination. In Gerstein, the disap-
proved Florida system did provide an opportun-
ity for obtaining a judicial determination of 
probable cause at arraignment, which the district 
court had found was often delayed a month or 
more after arrest. The use of arraignment to 
satisfy Gerstein's probable cause hearing 
requirement poses the same danger of a delayed 
determination which the court implicitly disap-
proved in Gerstein in its disapproval of the Flor-
ida system. 
The limited protection of the first appearance 
does not end here, however. As the Supreme 
Court reiterated in Gerstein, illegal arrest or de-
tention does not void a subsequent conviction.6o 
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Bolden, the case 
holding Rule 8.1 to be mandatory, relied on Ger-
stein in refusing to order dismissal ofthe charges 
although Rule 8.1 had been violated.61 In Cook v. 
State,62 the Court reaffirmed its holding in Bolden 
that Rule 8.1 is mandatory, but that a violation of 
the rule does not mandate dismissal. In Cook, the 
defendant's first appearance before a judicial 
officer did not OCCur until approximately a month 
after his arrest. The trial court refused to dismiss 
the charges but did suppress the in-custodial 
statement by the defendant during that period. In 
affirming the trial court's actions, the Court 
remarked that: 
[o]n the limited issue of dismissal, the 
scales are tipped in favor of the State for 
when the defendant is found guilty he has 
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suffered no prejudice as a result of being in 
jail. The remedy is to suppress the in-custo· 
dial statement as was done.s3 
Bolden and Cook make it clear that illegal deten-
tion alone will not constitute grounds for reversal 
of a conviction. The appropriate remedy for a 
defendant to seek initially in the trial court is 
suppression of any evidence obtained during the 
period of delay. Whether the failure of the trial 
court to suppress inadmissible evidence (or, con· 
ceivably, the loss of evidence during a period of 
illegal delay) will constitute reversible error 
depends, of course, on the relevance or prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. 
The question remains as to under what circum· 
stances the trial court must suppress evidence 
obtained during a period of illegal detention 
under Rule 8.1. For example, does the mere fact 
that a confession was obtained during the delay 
necessitate suppression of the confession, or is 
the illegal detention simply one factor to be con· 
sidered in assessing the voluntariness of the con-
fession? The Cook Court held that the confession 
was properly suppressed without any further 
inquiry into the voluntariness of the confession. 
Prior to Rule 8.1, the Court had made it clear that 
a failure to provide a prompt first appearance 
does not per 8e invalidate a confession given 
during the period of illegal detention,64 but is a 
factor used to assess voluntariness.65 However, 
Cook suggests, by its lack of further inquiry into 
the trial court's suppression of the confession 
once unnecessary delay was established, that the 
defendant need only show: (1) unnecessary delay, 
and (2) evidence obtained during that delay, to 
require suppression of the evidence. This ap-
proach would be in keeping with the McNabb-
Mallory rule that existed in the federal courts 
prior to 1968 under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requiring a first appearance 
without "unnecessary delay." The McNabb· 
Mallory rule was predicated on the Supreme 
Court's supervisory power over the federal courts, 
not on any constitutional mandate, and has been 
modified by statute.66 The Arkansas Supreme 
Court has a corresponding supervisory power 
over the state courts, and, as was done in 
McNabb-Mallory, may determine within that 
authority that suppression of evidence obtained 
during a period of impermissible delay under 
Rule 8.1 is necessary to effectuate the require-
ments of the rule. 
Finally, a defendant wishing to assert a Rule 
8.1 claim should be cognizant of the fact that the 
rule prohibits only "unnecessary delay." In Scott 
v. State,67 the defendant was seeking dismissal 
because of the failure to bring him before a mag-
istrate until his "arraignment" one year after the 
charges were filed and slightly less than four 
years after the crime bad occurred. The defend· 
ant claimed the loss of two alibi witnesses, the 
loss of one of whom appears to have occurred in 
the time between filing of the charges and his 
arraignment. The Court concluded that: 
[i]n view of the fact that Scott was in the 
penitentiary at the time the charges were 
filed, and that one continuance was at the 
request of defense counsel, we cannot say 
that the charges should be dismissed because 
of failure to bring him before a judicial 
officer as required by Rule 8.1 .... 
263 Ark. at 674, 566 S.W.2d at 740. In part the . 
Court's decision may be attributed to a reluctance 
to impose dismissal as the remedy for the prejudi-
cial delay and to its determination earlier in the 
opinion that the case had to be remanded in any 
. event on the strength ofthe defendant's due pro-
cess claim. The relevance of defense counsel's 
request for a continuance is certainly evident in 
determining whether the state is responsible for 
unnecessary delay, and thus is relevant to the 
determination of whetherrelief would be required. 
However, the relevance of the defendant's incar-
ceration in the state penitentiary is less clear.S8 
From the Court's language, it would appear that 
the Court may have assumed that a violation of 
Rule 8.1 had occurred, but that dismissal was an 
inappropriate remedy due to the defense's re-
quested continuance and the defendant's incar-
ceration during the period. Since unnecessary 
delay necessarily mandates a case by case 
determination of the state's responsibility for the 
delay, any delay attributable to defense continu-
ances should, of course, be excluded. Until such 
time as the Court clarifies what may and may not 
be considered "unnecessary delay," it remains to 
be seen what justifications offered by the state 
will be deemed sufficient.69 
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